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Abstract—Measuring round trip time (RTT) in a hostile network
is an unsolved problem in distributed systems engineering. Accurate
RTT measurements are important for distributed systems in which
timing packet arrival is useful, such as in a decentralized exchange
(DEX) with fairness guarantees. In this paper we present a new
RTT measurement algorithm for securely measuring RTT to an
untrusted server. We measure the RTT indirectly in order to prevent
tampering since a malicious node operator can arbitrarily change any
RTT measurement that interacts with his machine. The algorithm
approximates the RTT to a node by measuring the RTT to the
node that serves the /24 subnet containing the target node’s IP
address. This new RTT measurement algorithm provides an accurate,
practical, and generic solution for collecting network latency data in
a hostile network environment.
Index Terms—decentralized exchange, front-running, network la-
tency measurement, peer-to-peer computing, tamper resistance
I. INTRODUCTION
ODIN is a new algorithm that can be used to measure RTT to
untrusted servers. Existing RTT measurement solutions interact
directly with the target server and are therefore vulnerable to
tampering. There do not exist any prior algorithms for measuring
RTT in a hostile environment.
In this paper, we describe how to perform indirect assessments
of the target’s RTT to generate an approximate RTT that is accu-
rate enough for use in production systems. The ODIN algorithm
leverages structural properties of internet routing and IP address
block allocation patterns to produce a close estimate. The critical
insight in this paper is that the RTT to a node at an IP address
can be measured with consistent accuracy without ever interacting
with the node or its gateway. We show that pings, the naive way
to measure RTT, are easy to deceive and are therefore not suitable
for use in systems that require high-fidelity RTT measurements.
We outline the design of a RTT measurement algorithm, called
ODIN, with the following goals:
• Tamper-Resistance: Ensure that the target of the RTT mea-
surement cannot influence the RTT estimate.
• Accuracy: Provide high-quality RTT estimates.
• Generality: Define the algorithm as a generic RTT estimation
algorithm that is independent of any specific distributed
system implementation.
ODIN achieves these goals through platform independent trust-
less RTT approximation. By trustless approximation we mean that
we generate an estimate of RTT to the target based on RTT to
a node that is located near the target in the network. ODIN is
designed to be modular so that the system designer can easily
replace a ping-based RTT estimate with ODIN. The algorithm is
simple and easy to implement, especially when it is built on top
of the UNIX Traceroute program.
ODIN was designed to prevent front-running in a decentralized
exchange. Front-running is a method used by high-frequency
traders to make trades using non-public information. Front-
running can occur in a DEX when a node in the network receives
information about available trades before other nodes receive
the information. The simplest way to prevent front-running is to
ensure that all nodes receive the information at the same time by
introducing a RTT-dependent delay when sending information to
multiple nodes. THOR [1], an algorithm that measures pings to
centralized exchanges and delays orders such that the orders arrive
at the same time, is an example of RTT measurements being used
to prevent front-running.
Preventing front-running in a DEX is a more complex problem
than preventing front-running on a centralized exchange. The
added complexity comes from the front-runner’s ability to arbi-
trarily modify the code of the exchange that receives the orders.
This means that all direct measurements of the ping latency can
be circumvented, e.g. if an ICMP ping is used then a malicious
node operator could install a custom server for ICMP packets that
artificially delays sending a response in order to increase perceived
network latency. This would give the malicious node preferential
treatment by an algorithm that relies on ICMP pings to measure
RTT for ensuring that messages reach all peers at the same time.
We have implemented ODIN as part of xud, Exchange Union’s
decentralized cryptocurrency exchange [2]. We envision that other
distributed systems builders will benefit from having the option
of using the ODIN algorithm instead of pings for trustless RTT
measurements. The ODIN algorithm is sufficiently general to be
implementable in any language for any type of networked system.
Overall, this paper describes the design of a secure RTT
estimation algorithm and makes the following contributions. First,
a malicious actor cannot deceive the RTT estimation algorithm
by modifying the node that is being assessed or via DDoS of the
gateway router. Second, ODIN is modular, platform-independent,
and simple to implement. Finally, the ODIN algorithm is the first
RTT estimation algorithm designed for distributed systems operat-
ing in hostile environments and therefore enables the development
of new kinds of distributed systems.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides
a broad overview of our approach and describes the tamper-
resistance components of ODIN in detail. Section 3 describes our
implementation of ODIN on a DEX. Section 4 presents the results
of assessing ODIN’s accuracy for a random set of IP addresses.
Section 5 surveys related systems. Section 6 describes future work
and Section 7 summarizes our contributions.
II. THE ODIN ALGORITHM
ODIN is a generic algorithm for estimating RTT that operates
on top of any Traceroute implementation. Traceroute sends se-
quential probes to discover the path to an IP address. The central
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observation of ODIN is that an adversary cannot modify his
server’s location in the IP address space without controlling an
Autonomous System [3] or an entire /24 subnet, and that neither
of these resources are are available for use by individuals [4].
This reality of the modern internet makes ODIN suitable for
a variety of RTT measurement purposes, and we will use the
example of preventing front-running in a DEX to demonstrate
how ODIN prevents a dedicated and well-funded adversary from
being able to deceive the RTT estimate.
The threat model we mitigate against is a high-frequency trader
who co-locates his node with another node in the network and/or
arbitrarily modifies his server to appear to have different latencies
at different times in order to deceive the front-running prevention
mechanism. The malicious trader is profit motivated.
For someone running a node in the same datacenter as another
node, the RTT could be as low as 0.5ms [5]. For a node located
on the opposite side of the earth, the RTT can exceed 150ms.
A high-frequency trader who attempts to front-run should meet
overwhelming time and/or cost obstacles to making a profit, but
an honest user who happens to run a server far away from the
majority of nodes should not be penalised.
All measurements that interact directly with a potentially mali-
cious node can be deceived by artificially delayed response times.
Whether it is by slowing an application’s response to ping packets,
or by modifying the kernel’s network driver to respond slowly to
new connections, there is always a way to deceive a measurement
probe as long as the adversary has root or physical access to the
server [6].
In order to prevent the adversary from being able to deceive the
assessment algorithm, we measure the RTT to a node that with
high probability routes packets to the node’s IP address. We find
this node by using Traceroute to an IP address in the same /24
subnet as the target. This algorithm produces an approximate RTT
that is accurate enough for production use.
A. Sequential probing is the only way to discover the path
Routing in the internet is stateless, i.e. a request’s path is not
normally recorded anywhere. Sequential probes along the path is
the only way to discover the IP address of a node that serves
the target’s /24 subnet without using external aids. Traceroute [7]
discovers this path by sending a series of probes addressed to a
target IP address. The first probe has the Time To Live (TTL) field
set to 1, the next to 2, etc. such that each router on the path to
the target sends a response rejecting the probe due to its expired
TTL field. The TTL field is used this way in order to prevent the
request from being forwarded to the target, and instead elicits a
series of responses that describes the route to the target.
The protocol most commonly used by Traceroute is ICMP.
These can be sent without super user privileges, and most routers
will respond to ICMP requests. The existing implementation of
the ODIN algorithm uses Traceroute’s TCP syn mode such that
a half-open TCP handshake is used instead of ICMP pings. This
modification allows for more accurate data collection since TCP
syn probes are less likely to be stopped by firewalls [7].
B. We measure RTT to your neighbor, not to you
An adversary could deceive the route discovery algorithm by
sending forged IP packets claiming to be an intermediary between
the penultimate node and the target node. In order to secure ODIN
from this type of deception we randomize the last octet of the
target’s IP address and trace to this address instead. The RTT to
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Fig. 1. Route Discovery Protocol
an IP address in the same class C network as the target’s IP will
usually be very similar to the RTT to the target since class C
networks are almost always managed by a single provider. This
means that the adversary would need to own an entire class C
network, i.e. all 256 addresses in the same /24 subnet, in order
to reliably deceive the measurement. Only large corporations and
governments are allowed to own class C networks [4]. The tamper-
resistance guarantee of ODIN relies on the adversary not being
able to arbitrarily control a class C network for the sole purpose
of deceiving the RTT measurement.
C. Random assessment intervals
The adversary must be prevented from knowing when the next
assessment will take place since the adversary could easily, and
at low cost, spawn many short-lived servers at the time of the
assessment to do a statistical attack on the assessment algorithm
in order to evade the defense described in section II.B. Or, the
adversary could DDoS the gateway at the exact time of the
assessment to artificially slow the response times. A very short-
running DDoS would probably evade detection and/or punitive
action. The assessment interval is set using a cryptographically
secure pseudorandom number generator to prevent the adversary
from predicting the time of the assessment.
D. Incremental increase, immediate decrease
The ODIN algorithm is resilient against botnet DDoS attacks
via strategic adjustment of each peer’s RTT estimate. We consider
the scenario of an adversary Alice who uses a botnet to DDoS the
router that routes to the /24 subnet of her front-running xud server,
such that the router’s performance suffers. Bob’s xud server, a peer
of Alice’s server, will perceive a RTT to her server that is  seconds
slower than the actual RTT R. Alice now commands the botnet to
stop the DDoS attack on the router. Bob will believe that the RTT
time to Alice’s server is still R+ for T seconds. T is the number
of seconds until Bob’s server performs another assessment of the
RTT to Alice. In the context of a DEX, Alice gains T seconds
during which Bob’s server sends orders to her server  seconds
faster than to his other peers. This means that Alice can front-run
these orders and make a profit. Without preventative measures
Alice can repeat this process every 2T seconds such that she has
the opportunity to front-run 12 all orders she receives.
In order to mitigate this type of attack, we do as follows:
when the RTT assessment shows that the RTT to a peer has
increased, we increment the peer’s RTT by a fixed rate δ. When
the RTT assessment shows that the RTT has decreased, we update
immediately to the new smaller value. This means that Alice must
run her DDoS attack for δ seconds in order to receive preferential
treatment from peers, and as soon as she stops the attack she still
has only T seconds to take advantage of her deception. If δ is
small enough Alice will not be able to profit from front-running
since the cost of performing the DDoS attack will exceed the
possible profit from front-running.
This feature of the ODIN algorithm is relevant only for systems
that perform repeated assessments to the same node.
III. IMPLEMENTATION
ODIN is a general RTT measurement algorithm that can be
used in any distributed system. We have implemented ODIN as
a front-running prevention feature [8] of xud, Exchange Union’s
open source decentralized trading client. The front-running pre-
vention system is easily enabled/disabled via a boolean in the
configuration to support both traders who want optimal prices
via front-running protection and those who want optimal trade
completion speed.
All nodes in store the following state:
• rtt: Estimated round trip time. Initial value should be near
0.5ms to mitigate abuse via datacenter co-location [5].
• δ: The fixed rate of incremental increase of the RTT estimate
• MAX INTERVAL: Upper bound on the amount of time
between RTT measurements.
The algorithm for estimating RTT to the target is as follows:
• Replace last octet of target IP address with a random value
• Find the RTT to the last node that routes to the target
• Randomize the assessment interval so the time of the next
latency assessment cannot be predicted
The following pseudocode functions describe the algorithm in
more detail:
Algorithm 1 Helper Functions
1: function TRACEROUTE(addr)
. Uses UNIX Traceroute command to perform trace to IP
address. Returns list of nodes in path and latencies of each
node in path
2: function CRYPTO RANDOM(max value)
. Generates a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number
between 0 and max value
3: function RUN IN FUTURE(f, arg, t)
. Schedules function f to run with argument arg in t seconds
Algorithm 2 Estimate RTT
1: function ODIN(addr) . Estimates RTT to the IP address
2: octets = addr.split('.')
3: octets[3] = CRY PTO RANDOM(255)
4: addr = '.'.join(octets)
5: trace lines = TRACEROUTE(addr)
6: trace lines = trace lines.reverse()
7: for ip, time in trace lines do
8: if time then
9: if ip 6= addr then
10: if time < rtt then rtt := time
11: else if time > rtt then rtt := rtt+ δ
12: wait = CRY PTO RANDOM(MAX INTERV AL)
13: RUN IN FUTURE(ODIN, addr, wait)
Fig. 2. Error from using the penultimate node. This histogram shows the difference
between the RTT to the target node and the RTT to its penultimate node. n=5380.
IV. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the accuracy of the ODIN RTT
measurement system. We examine ODIN’s RTT estimates for
randomly generated IP addresses and show that ODIN can ac-
curately and precisely estimate RTT. Additionally, we show that
the fundamental assumptions of the ODIN algorithm are correct.
A. Setup
We analysed ODIN using 1000 randomly generated reachable
IP addresses. We determined whether or not an IP address was
reachable by performing a trace to the target and then verifying
whether or not the target was reached. Upon success of the the
trace, we performed a trace to a random IP address in the same
/24 subnet. We chose this new IP address by setting the last octet
of the original target IP address to a random number between 0
and 255. We recorded the RTT to both IP addresses and the RTT
to each of their penultimate nodes.
We sent three probes to each node on the path to the target IP
address. This generated at most 3 RTT values for the penultimate
node and the target. In cases where the randomized IP address
was not reachable we simply stored the RTT data for the last
node discovered by the trace since this was necessarily the node
responsible for the unreachable IP address’ /24 subnet [9]. In total
we collected 4373 RTT measurements across 1580 IP addresses.
B. RTT to the penultimate node
We assess the difference between the RTT to the target node
and the RTT to its penultimate node. We expect a small negative
percentage change, i.e. that the RTT to the penultimate node will
be slightly smaller than the RTT to the target. The data shows that
this intuition is correct. The average percent difference between a
target IP address’s penultimate node and the target itself is -9.6%.
In 33.4% of the samples, the RTT to the penultimate node was
actually greater than the RTT to the target. This result is likely
due to caching, load balancers, improperly configured networks,
or even DDoS protection systems.
C. Interchangeable penultimate node for all IP addresses in the
same /24 subnet
We assess how close the latency of the random target’s penul-
timate node is to the latency of the real target’s penultimate
Fig. 3. Error from using a randomized IP address in same subnet. This histogram
shows the percent error from using the penultimate node of a random IP address in
the same /24 subnet instead of using the penultimate node of the target IP address.
n=6544.
Fig. 4. Total Error. This histogram shows the total error of ODIN’s RTT estimate.
n=6333
node. The RTT to the random IP address’ penultimate node is
on average 2.6% less than the RTT to the target’s penultimate
node. We verified that this pattern is caused by the ordering
of the assessments, i.e. the second RTT assessment to the same
/24 subnet within a short timeframe was 20% more likely to be
faster than the first assessment. This phenomenon is likely due to
caching by routers along the route to the targeted /24 subnet.
When we control for the ordering of probes, which is reasonable
given that each iteration of our data collection script performed
two traces while the ODIN algorithm performs only one trace,
the error percent drops to around 0.5%. This very low error rate
indicates that there is no decrease in accuracy due to the ODIN
algorithm’s randomization of the RTT measurement’s target.
D. Total Error
Finally, we graph the total error in ODIN’s RTT estimates. The
average percent error of the estimate was -10.8%. Knowing this
average enables automatic adjustment of ODIN’s RTT estimates.
Overall, the percent difference of ODIN’s RTT estimate from the
target’s true RTT is consistent and small enough for reliable use
in production systems.
E. Summary
In this section, we have evaluated the accuracy of the ODIN
RTT estimation algorithm and its foundational assumptions. Our
evaluation indicates that ODIN achieves accurate estimates of
RTT with consistent error percentages relative to the actual RTT.
The foundational assumptions of the ODIN algorithm, i.e. that
the penultimate node of a random member of the same /24
subnet provides an accurate indicator of the target’s RTT, are
supported by the data. ODIN provides a generic, tamper-resistant,
and effective alternative to pings for measuring RTT.
V. RELATED WORK
Ping is the UNIX program that is typically used to measure
RTT. Ping uses an ICMP request to elicit a response from a host
or gateway [10]. Ping requires the presence of an ICMP server on
the target and is not tamper-resistant.
THOR is an algorithm implemented by RBC Capital Markets
[1] that measures pings to centralized exchanges and sends orders
with intentional delays to prevent front-running of the orders by
competing clients. THOR is the inspiration for ODIN, although
the ODIN algorithm differs greatly due to the system architecture
differences between centralized and decentralized exchanges.
VI. FUTURE WORK
The ODIN algorithm is already implemented as part of the xud
decentralized exchange. Future development of the algorithm will
include automatic tuning of the δ variable since its optimal value
is dependent on the financial profit potential of deceiving the RTT
measurement system to front-run orders.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper has demonstrated that it is possible to securely
estimate RTT to any IP address. We believe the ODIN algorithm
is a valuable addition to any distributed systems engineer’s toolkit.
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